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A B S T R A C T
A well-established narrative has existed for some time in British politics: “left behind” places are gradually
moving to the Conservatives as Labour dominate in urban, “cosmopolitan” areas. Merging constituency-level
census data with election results, this article applies various regression techniques to test this idea on multiple
definitions of “left-behindedness” at every general election between 1979 and 2017 in England and Wales.
Conclusive results indicate that the Conservatives have gained support at Labour's expense in largely older,
white, working class constituencies. However, Labour remain dominant in disadvantaged areas with high levels
of insecure employment and poverty remains the most important positive predictor of Labour's support. It is
therefore premature to argue that “left behind” places are moving from Labour to the Conservatives, providing
that “left behind” is re-conceptualised to refer to the most disadvantaged areas rather than older, white, “tra-
ditional working class” populations.
1. Introduction
The UK is becoming an aged, educated and ethnically hetero-
geneous country in which traditional notions of race, ethnicity and
“Britishness” are increasingly ambiguous. At the same time, deindus-
trialisation, the growth of the service and university sectors and a rise in
insecure labour has fragmented traditional class structures (Savage
et al., 2013) and advanced the decline in size of the manual working
class (Heath, Jowell, & Curtice, 1985, 2001). However, these changes
do not occur uniformly across time or space. Areas of the UK with
growing, young populations with easily marketable skills appear to be
thriving; other areas with shrinking, low-skilled and aging workforces
are in decline. These two diverging groups of people and places may be
referred to as the “winners” and “losers” of globalisation (Kriesi et al.,
2005; Rodrik, 1997) or as “cosmopolitan” and somewhat pejoratively,
“left behind” (Ford & Goodwin, 2014), or a more economically-oriented
“let down” (Watson, 2018). More than manifestations of traditional
occupational social class, these geographical divisions instead reflect a
complex mix of demographic, socioeconomic, geographic and cultural
patterns that are potentially restructuring voting behaviour as we
continue to move beyond a “two-class, two-party” system.
Across Western Europe, the so-called “left behind” – older, poorer,
white residents with low levels of education – are more likely to register
authoritarian and Eurosceptic viewpoints and offer support for extreme
right-wing parties (De Vries, 2017; Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der
Brug, & Kuhn, 2013; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2003; Teney,
Lacewell, & De Wilde, 2014). In the UK, whether cultural or economic
explanations for the patterns are favoured, these same demographic
groups and the areas in which they live have been associated with
hostility to immigration, support for UKIP and the vote to leave the EU
(Ford & Heath, 2014; Hobolt, 2016; Wheatley, 2016). At the 2017
general election, the expectation was that, with UKIP's collapse, voters
living in so-called “left behind” areas would abandon an increasingly
“cosmopolitan” Labour for a more nativist Conservative party. Indeed,
many areas that have experienced long-term decline, most notably ex-
mining constituencies in South Yorkshire and the Midlands, saw a clear
swing from Labour to the Conservatives, with growing, urban areas
moving in the opposite direction. This ‘continued tilting of the political
axis’, according to Jennings and Stoker (2017, p. 367), is restructuring
English politics and its electoral geography. It reflects a geographical
division between “cosmopolitan” urban areas with younger, highly-
educated, ethnically diverse populations and “left behind” areas,
characterised by ethnic homogeneity, low education levels, ageing
populations and long-term economic stagnation.
This is, however, only one way to understand what constitutes an
area being “left behind”, as other measures may better capture eco-
nomic deprivation and the precarity of local employment. This research
executes linear regression models (OLS), seemingly unrelated regres-
sion models (SUR) and generalised linear regression models (GLM) at
each election from 1979 to 2017 to show the changing importance of
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three different conceptualisations of “left behind” constituency-level
characteristics in explaining Labour and Conservative support:
A) Conventional: older age profile, lower educational levels, higher
proportions of routine/semi-routine and manufacturing occupa-
tions, low ethnic diversity and gross migration, less urban and a
large distance from a “cosmopolitan” city.
B) Economic deprivation: higher proportions of social housing, rates
of deprivation, unemployment, and poor health.
C) Precarious employment: higher proportions of insecure employ-
ment.
For each of these three definitions of what constitutes an area being
“left behind”, the following hypothesis is tested:
H0. At general elections between 1979 and 2017, the constituency-level
characteristics of “left behind” definition (insert A, B or C) have not
become increasingly negatively associated with Labour vote shares and
have not become increasingly positively associated with Conservative
vote shares.
H1. At general elections between 1979 and 2017, the constituency-level
characteristics of “left behind” definition (insert A, B or C) have become
increasingly negatively associated with Labour vote shares and
increasingly positively associated with Conservative vote shares.
This study builds upon previous academic research in several ways.
Firstly, Watson (2018) aside, this is the first serious attempt to critically
examine the “left behind” concept. In doing so, it offers a robust dis-
missal of Ford and Goodwin’s (2014) conventional conceptualisation,
by revealing how they overlook urban, ethnically diverse areas with the
most pronounced economic problems because they are not prone to
electing extreme right-wing parties or voting for Brexit. Secondly, ra-
ther than applying the concept to support for UKIP or Brexit, reliable
census data across ten general elections is used to present conclusive
evidence of long-term changes in the association between different “left
behind” characteristics and Labour and Conservative vote shares.
Thirdly, by incorporating measures of distance from the closest uni-
versity and “cosmopolitan” local authority into multiple con-
ceptualisations of “left behind” places, geography is treated as ‘intrinsic
rather than epiphenomenal’ to explaining Britain's electoral results
(Agnew, 1990, p. 15) – the key benefits of which are well documented
(Cutts & Webber, 2010; Johnston et al., 2001; Johnston & Pattie, 1998,
2006).
The article begins by charting the chronological shift from the mid-
twentieth century dominance of the class cleavage to the more recent
theorisation of a “left behind/cosmopolitan” division in British politics.
It then moves to a discussion of the data and methods used before
presenting an exploratory analysis of the changing relationship between
different sociodemographic and geographical conceptualisations of
“left-behindedness” and vote shares for Labour and the Conservatives.
After outlining the statistical models used, the driving factors behind
these patterns are then uncovered through an analysis of model coef-
ficients at each election. Finally, a discussion section addresses the
extent to which various types of “left behind” areas are moving from
Labour to the Conservatives.
1.1. Class-based voting and its decline
Of the political cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), it
was the class cleavage that structured and dominated twentieth-century
European politics (Johnston & Pattie, 2008; Triandafyllidou & Gropas,
2015; von Schoultz, 2017), manifesting in Britain in a “two-class, two-
party” model with the typically unionised working classes identifying
with Labour and the middle classes with the Conservatives (Butler &
Stokes, 1969). Since the 1970s, the influence of the social structure
upon voting has been declining across Western Europe (Mair, 1990),
such that in the UK, social class has become far less important in un-
derstanding voting behaviour (Best, 2011; Crewe, Sarlvik, & Alt, 1977;
Denver, 2007; Evans, 1999; Franklin, 1985; Franklin, Mackie, & Valen,
1992; Johnston & Pattie, 2006; Oskarson, 2005; Sanders, 1998; Tonge,
2000). This process of class dealignment appears to have accelerated at
the 2017 general election (Curtice, 2017; Ipsos Mori, 2017).
As well as shifts in voting behaviour, class dealignment may result
from “structural” or “ecological” changes (Flanagan, 1984; Lachat,
2007). Rapid deindustrialisation, tertiarisation and the increasing ac-
cessibility of higher education has created more amorphous social class
boundaries, leaving no clear dichotomy between manual/non-manual
workers around which Labour and the Conservatives can structure their
appeal (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2004; Gallagher, Laver, &
Mair, 2001). Labour's demise in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, may
not only reflect a loss of working class support, but also the shrinking
size of the working class as the country transitioned into a largely
service-based economy (Heath et al., 1985). For Evans and Tilley
(2011), the strategic response of parties to this changing class structure
- typically ideological convergence into the centre ground – furthered
the decline in class-based voting.
As a result of the growth of de-standardised forms of labour in a
competitive globalised economy, social class divisions are also being
replaced by divisions between secure and insecure employment (Beck,
1992). An insecure “class-in-the-making” has emerged – the “precariat”
- with distinctive relations of production characterised by ‘casualiza-
tion, informalisation, agency labour, part-time labour, phoney self-
employment and the new mass phenomenon of crowd-labour’
(Standing, 2015, p. 6). Their employment lacks the salary of the middle
class and the stable, fixed-hour contracts and options to unionise as-
sociated with the working class. Subsequently, they belong to neither.
Young “precariats” – a digital generation politicised by the recent
economic crisis (Standing, 2016) - were considered a significant factor
in the rise of Jeremy Corbyn (Foti, 2017), the relative success of Labour
in the 2017 general election (Jennings & Stoker, 2017) and support for
Bernie Sanders in the US (Kotkin, 2016). It would appear that, just as
older, white, working classes are moving towards the Conservatives,
younger, precariously-employed workers are aligning to Labour.
1.2. A “cosmopolitan” and “left behind” realignment?
Globalisation and tertiarisation have not only created precarious
forms of employment but broader groups of “winners” and “losers”
(Rodrik, 1997). The “winners” of globalisation are typically “cosmo-
politan citizens” and qualified workers in internationally competitive
employment sectors (Kriesi et al., 2008). The “losers” include em-
ployees in traditionally protected sectors, those without formal quali-
fications and those with strong emotional ties to a national identity.
These loose categories have been defined elsewhere as “cosmopolitan”
and “left behind”. Ford and Goodwin (2014, p. 11), in assessing support
for UKIP, described the archetypal “left behind” individual as older,
white, male, less educated, economically insecure and feeling ‘pro-
foundly uncomfortable’ in an increasingly ethnically diverse and cul-
turally heterogeneous society. By registering high levels of support for
Brexit and Donald Trump, this population are widely understood to be
engaging in a “cultural backlash” against recent social and cultural
changes (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).
These divisions may, as a result of uneven economic development,
also manifest geographically as “two Englands”: growing, “cosmopo-
litan” urban areas and shrinking “backwaters” characterised by low
pay, low-skilled employment and the out-migration of young graduates
(Jennings & Stoker, 2016). This chimes with the Front National's appeal
amongst the so-called “forgotten ones” living in peripheral, albeit more
rural locations in France (Ivaldi, Lanzone, & Woods, 2017) and Trump's
support amongst ‘people and communities who feel left behind by a
new globalizing economy’ in working-class rural areas (Ulrich-Schad &
Duncan, 2018, p. 76) and the Midwestern Rust Belt (McQuarrie, 2017).
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A political rift appears to be developing between cities with young,
ethnically diverse and highly-educated populations and towns and rural
areas with largely older, white, less highly-educated populations.
At the 2015 general election, Labour's appeal was stronger in
“cosmopolitan” than so-called “backwater” areas (Stoker & Jennings,
2015) and in 2017, Conservative support increased in older, largely
white, economically “left behind” areas and decreased in areas with
highly-skilled populations (Heath & Goodwin, 2017). Individual-level
analyses have also confirmed these findings (Warren, 2017). However,
the story may be more complex, with Labour also improving in areas
with higher shares of precarious workers and people in poor health
(Jennings & Stoker, 2017). Indeed, this is ‘somewhat at odds with [the]
characterisation of a party that has lost the “left behind”’ (Jennings &
Stoker, 2017, p. 359), particularly if this concept is extended beyond
areas largely comprised of white, older, working class residents with
low levels of education.
1.3. The theoretically fuzzy “left behind” concept
From an economic perspective, “left behind” populations might be
repositioned as “let down” – a group of people or places who, as a result
of poor government policy, have ‘no reason to feel good about their
economic prospects’ (Watson, 2018, p. 28). However, Ford and
Goodwin’s (2014) “left behind” conceptualisation begins not by iden-
tifying the most economically disadvantaged, but instead, the socio-
demographic and attitudinal characteristics of individuals that were
inclined to vote for UKIP. This group is ‘old, male, working class, white
and less educated’ - a shrinking demographic that sees cosmopolitan,
multicultural Britain as ‘alien and threatening’ (Ford & Goodwin, 2014,
pp. 159, 126). This argument that the “left behind” fuelled UKIP's rise is
tautological: if propensity to support UKIP is used to define the “left
behind”, it will always be true that the “left behind” were responsible
for the rise of UKIP.
It should be considered very carefully whether this group constitute
the “left behind” or whether there are multiple forms of “left-behind-
edness”. Firstly, it is not possible to possess “left behind” political views
or attitudes as this assumes linear attitudinal changes over time. It is not
sufficiently clear, for example, that long-term attitudes towards im-
migration and the EU are becoming substantially softer and more in-
tegrationist (see: Blinder & Richards, 2018; Simpson, 2019). Secondly,
defining the “left behind” in relation to support for UKIP or leaving the
EU, leads to ethnic minorities and a predominantly highly-qualified
white population being grouped together as “cosmopolitan”. This
overlooks the fact that ethnic minority groups are disproportionately
welfare-dependent, living in poverty, unemployed or in low-skilled,
insecure work and without degrees (Barnard & Turner, 2011; Sunak &
Rajeswaran, 2014). Goodwin (2016) writes that:
‘the places that gave the lowest levels of support to Brexit include
Hackney, Lambeth, Haringey, Islington, Cambridge, Edinburgh,
Richmond-upon-Thames, Kensington and Chelsea and Tower Hamlets —
all urban, diverse and relatively affluent areas.’
To categorise these urban areas as ‘relatively affluent’ conceals the
presence of serious disadvantage and localised economic inequality. In
fact, ranking 326 English local authorities by the proportion of the
population living in the most deprived Lower Super Output Areas
(LSAOs), Tower Hamlets is third, Hackney eleventh, Islington twenty-
sixth and Haringey twenty-eighth most deprived (Office for National
Statistics, 2015). By identifying “left behind” places by propensity to
vote Leave or UKIP, urban areas with serious economic disadvantage
are overlooked in favour of places with lower levels of poverty and
deprivation.
Perhaps subjective feelings of being “left behind” matter more than
objective economic conditions. Borrowing ideas from relative depriva-
tion theory (Runciman, 1966), it might be expected that when an in-
dividual perceives themselves, against their expectations, to be poorly
treated by the political or economic system, they switch voting alle-
giances or align with an insurgent party or politician (Altomonte,
Gennaro, & Passarelli, 2019; Whiteley, Poletti, Webb, & Bale, 2018).
However, examining data from the British Election Study (BES) Wave
14 (Fieldhouse et al., 2018), there is little indication that, compared to
poorer ethnic minorities in cosmopolitan areas, white, working class
respondents living in “non-cosmopolitan” areas feel more negatively
towards the two main parties or feel at greater economic risk (see
Appendix A.10). Presenting the white, working class as the “injured
population” (Rhodes, 2012) ignores the fact that their economic and
political grievances are likely to be shared, or even felt more strongly,
by ethnic minorities and other poorer residents in larger, urban areas.
With the continued blurring of class boundaries and the decline of
class-based voting, it is convenient to oversimplify complex socio-
economic, cultural, economic and geographical characteristics and
processes into a neat dichotomisation of “left behind” and “cosmopo-
litan” areas. A more nuanced understanding of political change can be
acquired by recognising varieties of “left-behindedness”, from shrinking
areas with largely older, white working class populations to areas
characterised by highly insecure employment and the most economic-
ally deprived, urban environments.
2. Methodological approach and data
The data come from a range of sources: the 1981, 1991, 2001 and
2011 censuses (Office for National Statistics, 2003, 2013; Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys, 1997, 2000) alongside other datasets
containing merged constituency-level demographic information and
general election vote shares (Crewe & Fox, 2011; Electoral Calculus
,ND; Fieldhouse et al., 2017; McAllister & Rose, 1988; Norris, 2001,
2005, 2010). The focus is confined to England and Wales as Scotland
and Northern Ireland represent unique cases with different electoral
cleavages. The only constituencies that have been omitted from the
datasets are the Speaker's seat at each election and any cases where
Labour or the Conservatives did not stand. In 1992, outside of any
boundary review, the constituency of Milton Keynes was divided into
two new constituencies: Milton Keynes North East and Milton Keynes
South West. Census data aggregated to the 1983 parliamentary con-
stituency level includes these two newer constituencies, even though
they were not in use at the 1983 or 1987 general election. The data for
the two constituencies has been amalgamated back into one - Milton
Keynes - based on the distribution of the population. In addition, for the
1979 general election, due to lack of available data, all variables in-
cluding vote shares are notional to the 1983 constituency boundaries.
2.1. Boundary changes and interpolation
Where the census and general election are less than three years
apart, non-interpolated census data has been used at the appropriate
boundaries. For 1987 and 1997, years in which the election falls more
than two years from the closest census, linear interpolation of socio-
demographic data has created estimates for the election year alongside
existing notional electoral results. In order to account for boundary
changes, the spatial unit of the start and end point of the interpolation is
always matched to the constituency boundaries used in the election. For
example, to interpolate data for 1997, census data from 2001 to 1991
are both calculated at the constituency boundaries that came into use in
1997.
For 2005, there is no publicly available 2011 census dataset no-
tional to the appropriate boundaries that can be used for interpolation.
Spatial overlaying has been used to estimate 2011 census data notional
to 1997 boundaries, from which accurate estimates for 2005 can be
interpolated. This technique - areal interpolation or areal weighting - is
a form of “spatial basis change” in which data is transferred across two
spatial units that do not have coinciding boundaries (Goodchild,
Anselin, & Deichmann, 1993). 2011 census data is first calculated for
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Output Areas across England and Wales. Then, output areas are over-
laid onto the parliamentary constituencies used in the 2005 general
election. The proportion of each output area that falls into each con-
stituency is used to distribute the population (Yale University, 2007).
Once the 2011 estimates at the 2005 boundaries are created, the linear
interpolation proceeds in the same manner used for 1987 and 1997. As
this method assumes a homogeneous distribution in both the popula-
tion and the variable of interest across output areas, the level of accu-
racy is directly correlated to the extent to which the variables are
homogeneously distributed (Murakami & Tsutsumi, 2011). The margin
of error for any assumption of even population distribution increases
proportionally to the size of the spatial unit. Output areas have there-
fore been used as they are the smallest geographical units for which
census data is provided and have been constructed to be as socially
homogeneous as possible.
3. Descriptive results: the changing locations of Labour and
Conservative support
The series of line graphs presented in the following section show the
bivariate, constituency-level correlation coefficients between variables
associated with the three conceptualisations of “left behind” areas and
Labour and Conservative vote shares at each election from 1979 to
2017.
3.1. Conventional conceptualisation of “left behind” places
Fig. 1 presents the bivariate correlation coefficients of variables
associated with the conventional definition of “left-behindedness” and
Labour and Conservative vote shares. Graph A shows a consistent,
gradual weakening of the negative association between manufacturing
and Conservative vote shares, such that, by 2017, it had been elimi-
nated. For Labour, the reverse is true, and for the first time in 2017 the
Labour vote share is, albeit very weakly, negatively correlated with the
proportion employed in manufacturing. The same trend can be seen
with the proportion in semi-routine/routine employment, to which the
Conservative vote share became markedly less negatively associated in
1997 and 2017 and the Labour vote share less positively associated in
1997 in particular. The contrast for Labour and Conservative support is
explicit: for the former, the positive association with working class
occupations has been eliminated; for the latter, the negative relation-
ship with working class occupations has been eliminated.
The correlation coefficients reported in graph B support the idea
that an age cleavage has developed in British politics, but rather than
2017 representing anything exceptional, this process has been occur-
ring since 1997. Labour's relative support has decreased in areas with
higher proportions of older people, and since 2010, increased in areas
with higher proportions of young people. An almost identical inverse
trend has occurred for the Conservatives. There is also a long term in-
creasing positive association between Labour vote share and the pro-
portion of full-time students (online appendix A.3).
Graph C shows the longstanding nature of Labour's higher vote
shares in urban areas, as the association between urban-ness and
Labour vote shares is consistently positive across all elections, with the
inverse association with the Conservatives. Regarding ethnic diversity,
there has been an increasingly positive association with Labour's vote
Fig. 1. The changing bivariate correlations between different variables associated with the conventional conceptualisation of “left-behindedness” and Labour and
Conservative vote shares across each general election (1979–2017) by constituency.
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share and an increasingly negative association with the Conservatives'
vote share. The same trend can be observed with the level of gross
migration, indicating that relative to areas with lower gross migration,
Labour's support is increasingly concentrated in areas with more tran-
sient populations.
Given these trends, it is unsurprising that the Labour vote share has
consistently been higher and the Conservatives vote share lower in
constituencies that are in close proximity to a university (graph D). At
the same time, in 1997 there was a marked shift in which Labour's
support became (albeit weakly) negatively - and the Conservatives'
positively - associated with increasing distance from the nearest “cos-
mopolitan” local authority. This matches findings that Labour's relative
support increased significantly in 1997 in areas with high levels of gross
migration, high proportions of university-educated residents and low
proportions of routine/semi-routine employment.
Graph E offers further evidence of the changing association between
education and Labour/Conservative support. Until 1992, there was a
moderate positive correlation between degree-level qualifications and
Conservative vote shares that has since declined to only 0.03 in 2017.
Although the association with degree-level education remains negative
for Labour, it has weakened substantially between 1979 and 2017. The
change in association with middle class occupations is less spectacular:
there is a consistent negative association with Labour vote shares and a
slowly declining positive association with Conservative vote shares - in
1979 the correlation coefficient was 0.75; by 2017 this was 0.41. For
home-ownership levels, the trend is even more stable: areas with high
levels of home ownership have consistently been more likely to return a
high Conservative vote share and a low Labour vote share. The greater
distance between the points over time is suggestive of a split between
more “middle class” areas, in which many home owners and the uni-
versity-educated increasingly inhabit different areas and vote for dif-
ferent parties accordingly.
3.2. Alternative conceptualisations of “left behind” places
Fig. 2 presents the bivariate correlation coefficients of variables
associated with the alternative definitions of “left-behindedness” and
Labour and Conservative vote shares. Graph F points to an unchanging
pattern: the most economically disadvantaged areas – as marked by
high proportions of deprivation, unemployment, poor health and social
housing – have consistently had much higher Labour vote shares and
lower Conservative vote shares than areas that were less disadvantaged.
Likewise, from graph G it is evident that Labour have retained strong
relative levels of support in areas with high proportions employed in
precarious occupations, despite a substantial weakening in the negative
association with Conservative vote shares in 2017. At the same time,
there is a clear long-term trend in which “cosmopolitan” areas have
become less favourable to the Conservatives and more favourable to
Labour. It is worth noting that an increasingly negative association
between precarious employment and poor health and turnout across the
time period suggests that whilst Labour remain strong in economically
deprived areas, an increasingly disproportionate number of voters in
these areas are choosing to disengage.
4. A summary of the regression models
4.1. Multivariate regression models
Regression models have been constructed for each general election
between 1979 and 2017 using largely identical variables in order to
accurately capture their changing associations with Labour and
Conservative vote shares. As the dependent variables – Labour and
Conservative vote shares - are continuous, OLS multivariate regression
has been used as the baseline method. To offer further support for any
findings and to account for the fact that the dependent variables are
bound between 0 and 100, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) and
Generalised Linear Models (GLM) have also been executed at each
election. While it would account for dependence from one election to
another, time series analyses have been avoided due to difficulties that
arise from the relatively short time period, changing constituency
boundaries and the inconsistent time periods between general elections
Fig. 2. The changing bivariate correlations between different variables associated with alternative conceptualisations of “left-behindedness” and Labour and
Conservative vote shares across each general election (1979–2017) by constituency.
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(Pickup, 2015). Instead, to gain a further sense of which elections
present atypical cases, the data are pooled and a time fixed effect model
is executed to predict Labour and Conservative vote shares.
4.2. Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables used in the regression models are out-
lined in Table 1, Table 2 and Section 4.5, according to whether they are
categorised under the conventional, economic deprivation or the pre-
carious employment definition of “left behind” places. Summaries of
variables included in the previous section but not the regression
models, due to multicollinearity, are outlined in online appendix A.1,
alongside more detailed explanations of the model variables.
4.3. The conventional “left behind” definition
4.4. The economic deprivation “left behind” definition
4.5. The precarious employment “left behind” definition
Initially, an ‘insecure employment’ variable has been created by
combining the standardised proportion of the population in precarious
employment (online appendix A.1) with the standardised proportion in
routine/semi-routine employment (2001 onwards) or semi-skilled/un-
skilled employment (pre-2001). This has subsequently been inverted into a
‘secure employment’ variable. In many election years, secure employment
was strongly positively correlated with degree-level qualifications, con-
firming that constituencies with highly qualified populations are un-
surprisingly more likely those with fewer precariously employed residents.
In order to retain these two conceptually important variables without
creating invalidated coefficients as a result of collinearity, a method of
sequential regression has been used. This involved first executing a con-
stituency-level regression model with degree-level qualifications as the
only explanatory variable and secure employment as the dependent
variable. The residual from this regression model represents the part of the
secure employment variable that is not correlated with degree-level qua-
lifications. The regular measure of degree-level qualifications has then
been included in the election regression models, whereas secure
Table 1
The explanatory variables analysed under the conventional “left behind” definition.
Variable Description (proportions of population unless otherwise stated)
Employed in manufacturing Of the economically active population (post-2001) or employed population (pre-2001), the proportion employed in manufacturing.
Educational qualifications Population with a level four qualification or higher (post-2001), higher degree, degree or diploma (1992 and 1997) or the proportion in
employment with degrees or professional vocational qualifications (pre-1992).
Age 16 to 29 Population aged 16 to 29.
Age 65 plus Population aged 65 and over.
Ethnic diversity According to Schaeffer (2014, 53), using a diversity index is well suited to measuring a quasi-monoethnic composition, such as that in
the UK. The Herfindahl concentration index is used (Hirschman, 1964) to calculate the probability that two randomly selected residents
of the same parliamentary constituency are of a different ethnicity (Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Kuha, & Jackson, 2014).
Gross migration A proxy for geographical mobility. From 1997 onwards, this is those that have migrated into the area from the UK or out of the area to
anywhere in the previous year. Prior to 1997, the measure includes only those with a different address to one year previously.
Urban-ness Not employed in ‘agriculture’ (1981 and 2011 censuses), ‘agriculture, hunting or forestry’ (2001 census) or ‘managers in farming,
horticulture, forestry and fishing’ and not employed in ‘other occupations in agriculture, forestry and fishing’ (1991 census).
Distance: cosmopolitan local authority Distance (decimal degrees) from centroid of the constituency to centroid of the nearest ‘cosmopolitan’ local authority. An index of
‘cosmopolitan-ness’ for each local authority in 2011 was calculated from four standardised variables: percent of population aged 18 to
29, with a level four qualification, living in an urban environment, and the ethnic diversity (Herfindahl index) of the local authority.
Distance: university The distance in decimal degrees from the centroid of each constituency to the closest university, based on designation of universities in
that particular year.
Table 2
The explanatory variables analysed under the economic deprivation “left behind” definition.
Variable Description (proportions of population unless otherwise stated)
Poor health Poor health is considered a proxy for poverty (Benzeval et al., 2014). Population who described their health as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ (2010 onwards), ‘not
good’ (2001 and 2005), population with a long-term illness (1992 and 1997) or those permanently sick (pre-1992).
Social renters Households that live in social (council/local authority/housing association) housing.
Unemployment rate Economically active population aged sixteen to seventy-four (post-2001) or aged sixteen and over (pre-2001) that were unemployed.
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employment has been replaced by the aforementioned residual.
Accordingly, the degree-level qualification coefficients in the following
models can be interpreted normally whereas the secure employment re-
sidual coefficients can be interpreted as the independent contribution of
secure employment once its shared explanatory contribution with degree-
level qualifications has been accounted for (Dormann et al., 2013;
Graham, 2003). To summarise, the secure employment variable is created
as follows:
If x1 is the percentage with a degree and x2 is the index of secure
employment, one first estimates:
= + +x a a x e2 0 1 1 1
In this initial simple linear regression, a0 refers to the constant and
e1 the error term. Once this regression is completed, the residual is used
in the following OLS models as such:
= + + + + +Y b b x b e b x ey0 1 1 2 1 3 3
Where Y refers to Labour or Conservative vote share, b0 is the constant,
b xn n the regression parameters, b e2 1 the regression parameter taking the
residual from the previous model and ey the error term.
5. Regression results: the changing predictors of Labour and
Conservative support
The following set of graphs present the beta coefficient values and
the statistical significance of the variables associated with each con-
ceptualisation of “left behind” constituencies across general elections
from 1979 to 2017. These data come from the OLS regression models
performed at each election, for which the full summary outputs can be
found in Table 3 and Table 4 at the end of this section. By assessing any
year-to-year crossover in the bounds of the confidence intervals, it is
possible to determine whether the coefficient in one election is statis-
tically significant from another election. Where relevant, supporting
findings from additional OLS models that include interaction effects
and SUR, GLM and fixed effects models are referred to. More detailed
outputs from these additional models can be found in online appendices
A.5 – A.8.
5.1. “Left behind”: conventional conceptualisation
Fig. 3A shows that, following a significant change in 1997, the pro-
portion employed in manufacturing has, excluding 2010 and 2015, had a
negative impact on Labour vote shares. Except in 2010, manufacturing
has had a positive impact on Conservative vote shares at each election
since 1997. Fig. 3B confirms that with increasing distance from the
nearest university, there is a consistent negative association with Labour
vote shares and a positive association with Conservative vote shares.
Since 1987, the negative effect for Labour has strengthened, such that in
2017 more than at any previous election, the closer an area is to a uni-
versity, the more likely it is to return a high Labour vote share.
In 1979, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of residents
with degree-level qualifications resulted in a mean 0.83 percentage
point decrease in the Labour vote share and a 0.75 percentage point
increase in the Conservative vote share (Fig. 3C). After weakening
considerably before 1997, there remained a weak positive Conservative
association and weak negative Labour association until 2017 when, the
effects reversed direction in the OLS, GLM and SUR models (online
appendices A.6 and A.7). Indeed, the standardised coefficients (online
appendix A.4) show that degree-level qualifications had changed from
being the most important negative predictor of Labour vote share in
1979 to the third most important positive predictor in 2017. The op-
posite trend was the case for the Conservatives.
Since 1992, there has been a statistically significant, positive in-
teraction effect between degree-level qualifications and poor health on
Labour vote shares (online appendix A.5). This implies that any effect
on Labour vote shares of having a high proportion of degree holders is
more positive in areas where there is also significant poverty – typically
larger, urban areas. For the Conservatives, the interaction effect has
been negative since 1992, implying that as the proportion in poor
health increases, the proportion with a degree has an increasingly ne-
gative effect on Conservative vote shares.
Fig. 3D shows that before 1992 there was a small but significant ne-
gative effect of increasing the proportion of over 65s on Labour vote shares
and a small but significant positive effect on Conservative vote shares.
Since the 1992 general election, this effect has strengthened: in 1997 for
example, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion aged 65 plus was
associated with a 1.59 percentage point vote share decrease for Labour
and a 1.62 percentage point increase for the Conservatives. Indeed, by
2017, the proportion of older residents had, relative to other variables, the
strongest positive effect and negative effect on Conservative and Labour
vote shares respectively (online appendix A.4). In contrast, the proportion
of younger people appears to be a less clear-cut driver of vote shares:
although by 2017 the proportion of young people had a positive and ne-
gative association with Labour and Conservative vote shares respectively,
it remains less substantial than the pre-1992 effects.
5.2. “Left behind”: alternative conceptualisations
Consistent with the bivariate correlation coefficients, the poor health
proxy for economic disadvantage (Fig. 4E) has been consistently posi-
tively associated with Labour vote shares and negatively associated with
Conservative vote shares across all elections. From the time fixed effect
models (online appendix A.8), it is clear that even controlling for shocks,
such as the 1997 landslide, poor health has a consistent positive asso-
ciation with Labour and negative association with Conservative vote
shares across time. The standardised coefficients reported in the online
appendix A.4 confirm that, in fact, poor health was a more important
positive predictor of Labour vote shares in 2017 than it was in 1979,
relative to other characteristics. For the Conservatives, poor health be-
came an even stronger negative predictor relative to other variables.
Fig. 4F shows the effect of the level of secure employment upon the
vote shares only once the effect of the proportion of residents with
degree-level qualifications is accounted for. The pattern over time is
one of fluctuation but clarity: secure employment in a constituency has
a consistently positive effect on Conservative vote shares and a con-
sistently negative effect on Labour vote shares above and beyond the
impact that it had already made through its relationship with degree-
level qualifications. This is confirmed in online appendix A.4 which
shows that in both 1979 and 2017, secure employment was the second
most important negative predictor of Labour vote share.
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Table 3
The regression output from OLS models predicting the Labour vote share across constituencies (1979–2017).
Labour vote share (%)
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017
constant −26.700*** −34.600*** −55.100*** −42.500*** −62.100*** −99.000*** −81.500*** −40.800 −80.000** −20.800
(9.210) (9.540) (11.900) (11.400) (15.400) (19.600) (24.300) (27.400) (33.800) (31.900)
unemployment rate −0.290** 0.049 0.021 −0.092 −0.417** −0.137 −0.191 −0.039 0.788** 0.608*
(0.121) (0.128) (0.141) (0.114) (0.182) (0.225) (0.271) (0.293) (0.354) (0.335)
manufacturing 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.134*** 0.089** −0.268*** −0.433*** −0.356*** −0.099 0.048 −0.300***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.047) (0.042) (0.061) (0.069) (0.082) (0.100) (0.120) (0.115)
social renters 0.197*** 0.182*** 0.235*** 0.200*** 0.188*** 0.104** 0.066 0.094 0.164** −0.033
(0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038) (0.042) (0.050) (0.057) (0.071) (0.066)
degree-level qualifications −0.833*** −0.699*** −0.395*** −0.224*** −0.332*** −0.344*** −0.314*** −0.046 −0.310*** 0.198***
(0.081) (0.085) (0.083) (0.062) (0.059) (0.050) (0.056) (0.062) (0.086) (0.071)
secure employment
(residual)
−2.290*** −2.380*** −1.800*** −1.680*** −2.830*** −3.610*** −3.550*** −2.770*** −1.600*** −2.430***
(0.412) (0.433) (0.388) (0.307) (0.341) (0.379) (0.388) (0.373) (0.450) (0.425)
aged 16 to 29 0.892*** 0.697*** 0.761*** 0.286* 0.160 −0.017 −0.179* 0.106 −0.125 0.394***
(0.190) (0.200) (0.221) (0.156) (0.121) (0.097) (0.098) (0.083) (0.097) (0.092)
aged 65 plus −0.253*** −0.311*** −0.291*** −1.430*** −1.590*** −1.230*** −1.350*** −1.010*** −1.250*** −1.080***
(0.080) (0.084) (0.112) (0.103) (0.122) (0.121) (0.140) (0.140) (0.166) (0.158)
ethnic diversity 0.021 0.091** 0.025 0.052** 0.047* −0.021 −0.076*** 0.024 0.059* 0.085***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.031)
poor health 4.530*** 5.410*** 4.780*** 3.310*** 2.530*** 2.580*** 2.890*** 4.490*** 4.960*** 4.870***
(0.397) (0.421) (0.312) (0.153) (0.150) (0.200) (0.217) (0.321) (0.384) (0.364)
distance: cosmopolitan LA 3.280*** 4.180*** 1.620*** 1.630*** −1.560** −1.470** −0.749 0.036 −1.310 0.437
(0.790) (0.833) (0.535) (0.446) (0.634) (0.681) (0.745) (0.902) (1.060) (1.000)
distance: university −6.380*** −8.060*** −4.630*** −4.440*** −2.340 −3.690* −6.280*** −9.550*** −7.970*** −10.800***
(1.480) (1.560) (1.540) (1.270) (1.770) (1.910) (2.130) (2.130) (2.940) (2.770)
urban-ness 0.559*** 0.597*** 0.710*** 0.644*** 1.140*** 1.680*** 1.450*** 0.751*** 1.210*** 0.465
(0.095) (0.099) (0.128) (0.121) (0.155) (0.194) (0.235) (0.263) (0.326) (0.306)
third party vote share −0.672*** −0.646*** −0.602*** −0.606*** −0.751*** −0.688*** −0.518*** −0.521*** −0.777*** −0.642***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.090) (0.039)
N 560 560 560 561 567 569 569 572 572 572
Adjusted R2 0.882 0.875 0.893 0.931 0.925 0.901 0.852 0.852 0.818 0.852
Notes: ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4
The regression output from OLS models predicting the Conservative vote share across constituencies (1979–2017).
Conservative vote share (%)
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017
constant 94.400*** 136.000*** 98.000*** 54.600*** 63.500*** 86.300*** 53.400** 59.900** 61.300* 54.800*
(10.100) (9.390) (11.800) (11.500) (14.100) (19.000) (22.500) (27.400) (33.700) (30.800)
unemployment rate 0.179 −0.019 −0.145 −0.123 0.388** 0.252 0.069 0.197 −0.563 −0.763**
(0.134) (0.126) (0.140) (0.115) (0.167) (0.217) (0.250) (0.294) (0.353) (0.323)
manufacturing −0.099** −0.107*** −0.101** −0.037 0.285*** 0.394*** 0.251*** 0.172* 0.424*** 0.545***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.047) (0.043) (0.055) (0.067) (0.075) (0.100) (0.120) (0.111)
social renters −0.218*** −0.182*** −0.225*** −0.158*** −0.193*** −0.069* −0.071 −0.070 −0.076 0.103
(0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.041) (0.046) (0.058) (0.070) (0.063)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued)
Conservative vote share (%)
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017
degree-level qualifications 0.746*** 0.732*** 0.243*** 0.116* 0.181*** 0.148*** 0.170*** 0.106* 0.194** −0.243***
(0.089) (0.083) (0.083) (0.062) (0.054) (0.048) (0.051) (0.062) (0.086) (0.069)
secure employment (residual) 1.730*** 2.600*** 1.320*** 1.330*** 1.670*** 2.720*** 2.770*** 2.170*** 2.090*** 2.240***
(0.453) (0.427) (0.386) (0.311) (0.311) (0.366) (0.358) (0.373) (0.449) (0.411)
aged 16 to 29 −0.723*** −0.800*** −0.803*** −0.365** −0.318*** −0.145 −0.018 −0.238*** −0.553*** −0.521***
(0.209) (0.197) (0.220) (0.158) (0.111) (0.094) (0.091) (0.083) (0.097) (0.089)
aged 65 plus 0.291*** 0.233*** 0.253** 1.380*** 1.620*** 1.360*** 1.400*** 1.180*** 0.689*** 1.210***
(0.088) (0.082) (0.112) (0.105) (0.112) (0.117) (0.129) (0.140) (0.165) (0.153)
ethnic diversity −0.130*** −0.121*** −0.013 −0.058** −0.064*** −0.005 0.029 −0.003 0.022 −0.029
(0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.030)
poor health −5.040*** −5.440*** −5.120*** −3.460*** −3.060*** −3.890*** −3.940*** −5.890*** −5.320*** −5.740***
(0.437) (0.414) (0.310) (0.155) (0.137) (0.193) (0.200) (0.321) (0.382) (0.352)
distance: cosmopolitan LA −5.830*** −3.930*** −2.680*** −2.680*** −0.835 −0.632 −1.220* −1.900** −1.440 −1.750*
(0.870) (0.820) (0.532) (0.452) (0.580) (0.658) (0.688) (0.903) (1.050) (0.966)
distance: university 10.100*** 7.860*** 7.670*** 8.340*** 4.780*** 6.300*** 9.020*** 8.180*** 5.590* 6.240**
(1.630) (1.540) (1.530) (1.290) (1.620) (1.850) (1.970) (2.130) (2.930) (2.680)
urban-ness −0.267** −0.605*** −0.125 0.260** −0.061 −0.426** −0.064 −0.007 −0.016 0.179
(0.105) (0.097) (0.127) (0.123) (0.142) (0.188) (0.217) (0.263) (0.325) (0.295)
third party vote share −0.206*** −0.340*** −0.246*** −0.254*** −0.169*** −0.220*** −0.321*** −0.356*** 0.219** −0.220***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.036) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.090) (0.037)
N 560 560 560 561 567 569 569 572 572 572
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.801 0.815 0.864 0.847 0.826 0.837 0.807 0.773 0.808
Notes: ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Fig. 3. The changing value of the beta coefficients and statistical significance for the manufacturing (3A), distance from the closest university (3B), degree-level
qualifications (3C) and aged 65 plus (3D) variables across each general election (1979–2017) by constituency.
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6. Discussion: are “left behind” areas leaving an increasingly
“cosmopolitan” labour behind?
Media coverage since the 2017 general election has described an
increasingly “cosmopolitan” Labour party losing its core support to the
Conservatives and thereby its raison d’être: ‘it should be hard indeed for
the [Labour] party to find cause for celebration in the fact that the
Conservatives are so rapidly becoming the party of the “left behind"’
(Allington, 2017). Yet, as this work has emphasised, the extent to which
this is the case at the constituency-level is determined by any definition
of “left behind” that is adopted.
This research presents clear evidence that constituencies with high
proportions of Ford and Goodwin’s (2014) “left behind” – older, white
and working class – are gradually moving away from the Labour party
towards the Conservatives. The alternate hypothesis for the conven-
tional “left behind” definition is confirmed: the proportion employed in
manufacturing and the proportion over 65 are increasingly positively
associated with the Conservatives and negatively associated with La-
bour vote shares. At the same time, degree-level qualifications has be-
come a negative predictor of Conservative vote shares and a positive
predictor of Labour vote shares.
Rather than a sudden change in electoral geography, 2017 re-
presents – much like 1997 - a moderate acceleration in this long-term
process in which the Conservatives are gradually acquiring support in
areas with many routine/semi-routine occupations or manufacturing
jobs. Whilst this might offer some support for Evans and Tilley’s (2017)
argument that class voting declined significantly in the 1990s with New
Labour's more moderate politics, it also challenges any assertion that on
a more radical platform, Labour have managed to put the brakes on
their declining support in largely white working class areas. In spite of
rather different ideological positions, Jeremy Corbyn and Tony Blair
have both led Labour through a period of accelerated relative decline in
these more conventionally “left behind” areas of England and Wales.
Labour's support has increased significantly in so-called “cosmopo-
litan” areas close to universities, areas with fewer older people, those
with high proportions of students and most rapidly in constituencies
with many university graduates. Although it remained the case in 2017
that the Conservatives gained marginally higher support than Labour in
constituencies with large proportions of university-educated residents,
once other factors are accounted for, education had a positive impact
on Labour's vote share, supporting individual-level findings by Curtis
(2017). This is not a paradox, but instead is suggestive of a possible
geographical split within the middle class. In 1979, people with degrees
tended to live in less ethnically diverse areas with high home ownership
– all factors contributing to Conservative dominance. By 2017, as the
proportion of the population with degrees has risen substantially, they
are more likely to live in younger, ethnically diverse, economically
unequal constituencies with lower than average home ownership –
more “cosmopolitan” areas in which Labour tend to do well.
Whilst there is evidence of an increasingly “cosmopolitan” Labour
losing ground to the Conservatives amongst “left behind” con-
stituencies, this is only one part of the story. If the economic depriva-
tion definition of “left behind” is adopted, it seems premature to suggest
that they have even begun abandoning the Labour party for the
Conservatives. That is, of course, if we recognise that those living in
deprivation in ethnically diverse cities can be “left behind” and not
simply cast as “cosmopolitans” or “Anywheres” (Goodhart, 2017). La-
bour's superiority over the Conservatives was as strong in the most
deprived areas of England and Wales in 2017 as it was when Margaret
Thatcher came to power. This confirms the null hypothesis outlined in
the introduction for the economic deprivation definition of “left be-
hind” constituencies. In fact, this research shows that poverty itself has
become an even stronger positive predictor of returning a Labour MP
over time.
The Conservatives have also failed to make significant inroads into
Labour support in constituencies with high levels of insecure labour,
confirming the null hypothesis for the precarious employment defini-
tion of “left behind”. This confirms Jennings and Stoker’s (2017) find-
ings that Labour's support “shored up” in areas with high proportions of
“precariats” and increased slightly in more “cosmopolitan” areas be-
tween 2005 and 2017. Nonetheless, caution should be urged in as-
suming that the anger and anxiety of the increasing numbers of “pre-
cariats” described by Standing (2016) will automatically generate a
new class cleavage or mass support for Labour. While places they
Fig. 4. The changing value of the beta coefficients and statistical significance for poor health and the secure employment (residual) variable (once its shared
explanatory contribution with degree-level qualifications has been accounted for) across each general election (1979–2017) by constituency.
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inhabit may be, as Standing (2015) suggests, firmly on Labour's side,
further analysis of the data shows that they have – with exceptions –
had disproportionately decreasing levels of turnout between 1979 and
2015. This reflects longstanding evidence of a negative association
between turnout and economic insecurity (Dempsey & Johnston, 2018;
Heath, 2016; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).
In order to establish a core bloc of voters in the “precariat” “mass
class” (Standing, 2015), Labour might focus on strategies to increase
turnout. For the Conservatives, they may benefit from an aging popu-
lation, but “traditional working class” areas of the country are
shrinking. Courting a demographic group, that is likely to become in-
creasingly superseded by the university-educated and insecure “pre-
cariats” living in urban areas with low levels of home ownership, might
not represent the most sensible strategy to achieving long-term elec-
toral success. This, of course, is dependent on the relative size and
spatial distribution of these different demographic groups – a particular
problem for Labour whose support could become too heavily localised
in urban areas that are increasingly home to their core demographic
groups: young, ethnically diverse, university-educated residents as well
as the most economically disadvantaged.
This detailed statistical analysis of each election between 1979 and
2017 has shown that the “left behind” thesis is far too simplistic.
Ultimately, understanding whether so-called “left behind” places have
left Labour behind for the Conservatives is determined by the definition
of “left behind” that is adopted. If we understand “left behind” areas to
be those with large proportions of old, low-skilled, white, working class
people living far enough from “cosmopolitan” cities, then there is sig-
nificant supporting evidence presented here. However, if a con-
ceptualisation of “left behind” is adopted which describes con-
stituencies that are the most economically disadvantaged – often
ethnically diverse, urban areas - then there is no evidence of any shift
away from Labour to the Conservatives. In fact, this research suggests
that Labour's support remains particularly strong in those areas of the
country with not only the most significant levels of poverty but also
those with the greatest proportion of insecure employment. On these
grounds, this research demonstrates the need for a multidimensional
understanding of “left-behindedness” that can bring about a more
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